Title
RIMNet: Recommendation Incentive Mechanism based on evolutionary game dynamics in peer-to-peer service networks.
Abstract
In peer-to-peer service networks, autonomous agents gain utilities through getting services from others. However, providing services is so costly that rational agents may prefer to defect rather than to cooperate. In order to provide scalable and robust services in such networks, incentive mechanisms need to be introduced. In this paper, we propose a novel approach RIM (Recommendation Incentive Mechanism) by building a cooperative agents recommendation system. And, in order to investigate the acceptance and performance of the proposed RIM, evolutionary game theory has been used. By studying the evolutionary stable state, we demonstrate the performance of the RIM-based model by both considering two scenarios PRIM/IRIM (Perfect/Imperfect Recommendation Incentive Mechanism). To comprehensively confirm the robustness of our mechanism: (1) OCMP (One Consumer Multi-service Providers) method has been discussed, in which agent could simultaneously request services from k (k>1) different agents; (2) a FS (Four-Strategies) game model has been further introduced; (3) QS (Quantity Sensitivity) scenario has been researched, in which the utility of an agent is sensitive to the amount of received services. By using the Lyapunov stability theory, it is qualitatively proved that non-cooperative agents can be well suppressed in our proposed RIM. Finally, extensive numerical and simulation experiments are conducted to highlight the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our model.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1016/j.knosys.2018.12.024
Knowledge-Based Systems
Keywords
Field
DocType
Evolutionary game theory,Cooperation theory,Incentive mechanism,Peer-to-peer service networks,Eigentrust
Recommender system,Autonomous agent,Peer-to-peer,Incentive,Rational agent,Computer science,Robustness (computer science),Artificial intelligence,Evolutionary game theory,Machine learning,Distributed computing,Scalability
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
166
0950-7051
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
28
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Mingchu Li146978.10
Xing Jin222.05
Cheng Guo3479.84
Jia Liu434.77
Guanghai Cui562.76
Tie Qiu689580.18