Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study the problem of whether and how a patent-holding firm (supplier S1) should license its technology patent to a potential rival (supplier S2). If the license is given, the two suppliers both produce a critical component for their downstream manufacturer simultaneously (sequentially) when the manufacturer adopts a dual (contingent) sourcing mode. However, both suppliers face risks of complete supply disruptions. In the study, we examine how the supply risk affects S1's technology licensing willingness and under which conditions royalty or fixed-fee licensing is its optimal strategy. The results show that when the manufacturer adopts contingent sourcing, S1 is always willing to license its technology to S2 and fixed-fee licensing is the optimal strategy. However, when dual sourcing is adopted, either royalty and fixed-fee licensing could be S1's optimal licensing strategy, depending on the reliability degree of the suppliers' productions. Our findings extend the conclusion from previous researchers about royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a Cournot duopoly model. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1080/00207543.2018.1521535 | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
technology licensing, supply disruption, dual sourcing, contingent sourcing | Journal | 57 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
7 | 0020-7543 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.36 | 15 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| feng yang | 1 | 20 | 2.10 |
| Chuanya Jiao | 2 | 1 | 0.36 |
| Sheng Ang | 3 | 1 | 2.73 |