Title
A practical complexity-theoretic analysis of mix systems
Abstract
The Minimal-Hitting-Set attack (HS-attack) [10] is a well-known passive intersection attack againstMix-based anonymity systems, applicable in cases where communication behaviour is non-uniform and unknown. The attack allows an observer to identify uniquely the fixed set of communication partners of a particular user by observing the messages of all senders and receivers using a Mix. Whilst the attack makes use of a provably minimal number of observations, it also requires solving an NP-complete problem. No prior research, to our knowledge, analyses the average complexity of this attack as opposed to its worst case. We choose to explore the HS-attack, as opposed to statistical attacks, to provide a baseline metric and a practical attack for unambiguously identifying anonymous users. We show that the average complexity of the HS-attack can vary between a worst-case exponential complexity and a linear-time complexity according to the Mix parameters. We provide a closed formula for this relationship, giving a precise measure of the resistance of Mixes against the HS-attack in practice, and allowing adjustment of their parameters to reach a desired level of strength.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2011
ESORICS
mix parameter,average complexity,well-known passive intersection attack,practical complexity-theoretic analysis,linear-time complexity,minimal-hitting-set attack,practical attack,mix system,communication partner,communication behaviour,statistical attack,worst-case exponential complexity
Field
DocType
Volume
Attack model,Computer security,Computer science,Exponential complexity,Anonymity,Observer (quantum physics)
Conference
6879
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
6
0.47
References 
Authors
13
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dang Vinh Pham1111.56
Joss Wright2396.42
Dogan Kesdogan335542.53