Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Nearly all of the currently used and well-tested signature schemes (e.g. RSA or DSA) are based either on the factoring assumption or the presumed intractability of the discrete logarithm problem. Further algorithmic advances on these problems may lead to the unpleasant situation that a large number of schemes have to be replaced with alternatives. In this work we present such an alternative --- a signature scheme whose security is derived from the hardness of lattice problems. It is based on recent theoretical advances in lattice-based cryptography and is highly optimized for practicability and use in embedded systems. The public and secret keys are roughly 12000 and 2000 bits long, while the signature size is approximately 9000 bits for a security level of around 100 bits. The implementation results on reconfigurable hardware (Spartan/Virtex 6) are very promising and show that the scheme is scalable, has low area consumption, and even outperforms some classical schemes. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | 10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_31 | CHES |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
security level,factoring assumption,implementation result,classical scheme,signature size,signature scheme,algorithmic advance,practical lattice-based cryptography,well-tested signature scheme,embedded system,discrete logarithm problem | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm,EdDSA,Post-quantum cryptography,Merkle signature scheme,Computer science,Cryptography,Theoretical computer science,Lattice-based cryptography,Embedded system,Discrete logarithm,Schnorr signature | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
7428 | 0302-9743 | 77 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
2.27 | 33 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tim Güneysu | 1 | 924 | 77.37 |
| Vadim Lyubashevsky | 2 | 1174 | 59.91 |
| Thomas Pöppelmann | 3 | 357 | 17.96 |