Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper investigates the competition between payment card network platforms in an artificial payment card market. In the market, we model the interactions between consumers, merchants, and competing card schemes and obtain their optimal pricing structure. We allow platform operators to charge consumers and merchants with fixed fees, provide net benefits from card usage/acceptance, and engage in marketing activities. We assume that the consumer side exhibits lower demand elasticity. With these settings, we establish that consumers benefit from a reduction of the numbers of competing payment cards through lower fees and higher net benefits, while merchants remain largely unaffected. The two-sided nature of the market leads to the result that having more competitors actually reduces prosperity for customers. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.20965/jaciii.2011.p0188 | JOURNAL OF ADVANCED COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENT INFORMATICS |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
two-sided markets, network externalities, agent-based modeling, competition | ATM card,Computer science,Issuer,Charge card,Network effect,Commerce,Artificial intelligence,Payment card,Payment,Payment service provider,Machine learning,Competitor analysis | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
15 | 2 | 1343-0130 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.55 | 0 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova | 1 | 5 | 2.62 |
| Edward P. K. Tsang | 2 | 899 | 87.77 |
| Andreas Krause | 3 | 2 | 0.55 |