Title
Security Weakness in a Provable Secure Authentication Protocol Given Forward Secure Session Key
Abstract
Shi, Jang and Yoo recently proposed a provable secure key distribution and authentication protocol between user, service provider and key distribution center(KDC). The protocol was based on symmetric cryptosystem, challenge-response, Diffie-Hellman component and hash function. Despite the claim of provable security, the protocol is in fact insecure in the presence of an active adversary. In this paper, we present the imperfection of Shi et al.'s protocol and suggest modifications to the protocol which would resolve the problem.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1007/978-3-642-02457-3_18
ICCSA
Keywords
Field
DocType
fact insecure,hash function,authentication protocol,security weakness,symmetric cryptosystem,provable security,forward secure session,diffie-hellman component,service provider,active adversary,provable secure authentication protocol,key distribution center,provable secure key distribution,forward security,authentication,diffie hellman,cryptography,key distribution
Wide Mouth Frog protocol,Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol,Interlock protocol,Oakley protocol,Computer science,Computer security,Otway–Rees protocol,Computer network,Authentication protocol,Key-agreement protocol,Provable security
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
5593
0302-9743
3
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.48
16
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Mijin Kim1449.04
Heasuk Jo2344.36
Seungjoo Kim393984.84
Dongho Won41262154.14