Title
A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games.
Abstract
We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al. in Theory Decis 79:251–283, ). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, ), but takes into account the direction of the edges connecting any two players in the rooted tree, which reflects some dominance relation between them. Our proofs rely on interesting properties that we provide for a general class of bidding mechanisms.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2290-5
Annals OR
Keywords
Field
DocType
Bidding approach,‘Take-it-or-leave-it’ procedure,Implementation,Rooted tree TU-games,Sequential equal surplus division
Superadditivity,Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Dominance relation,Divisibility rule,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Mathematical proof,Bidding,Digraph,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
253
1
0254-5330
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.37
5
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Sylvain Béal17012.23
Eric Rémila232945.22
Philippe Solal37914.55