Paper Info
Title
Defence and attack of complex interdependent systems.
Abstract
A defender defends and an attacker attacks each of n interdependent targets which can operate or fail and be in 2(n) possible states. Interdependence is modelled from each target to each other target. Despite such systems usually being analysed numerically, this paper succeeds in determining analytical solutions, accounting for unit effort costs, target values, and contest intensities. Increasing interdependence from some targets to some other targets induce both players to exert higher efforts into the former targets. For 100% interdependent targets, the attacker encounters a substitution effect. In contrast, for independent targets the defender encounters a substitution effect, defending the essential targets. For similarly advantaged players, increased target contest intensities cause higher efforts and lower expected utilities. Both players may withdraw in both 100% interdependent and independent systems. Applying the model to the US economy, we illustrate how interdependence between petroleum refineries, oil and gas extraction and air transportation impact defence, attack and expected utilities.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1080/01605682.2018.1438763
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY
Keywords
Field
DocType
Risk analysis,survivability,interdependence,network,multi-state system
Interdependence,Survivability,Computer science,Risk analysis (business),Microeconomics,CONTEST,Substitution effect,Management science
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
70.0
3.0
0160-5682
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.39
17
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Kjell Hausken153746.28