Abstract | ||
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Key-encapsulation mechanisms secure against chosen cipher-text attacks (IND-CCA-secure KEMs) in the quantum random oracle model have been proposed by Boneh, Dagdelen, Fischlin, Lehmann, Schafner, and Zhandry (CRYPTO 2012), Targhi and Unruh (TCC 2016-B), and Hofheinz, Hovelmanns, and Kiltz (TCC 2017). However, all are non-tight and, in particular, security levels of the schemes obtained by these constructions are less than half of original security levels of their building blocks. In this paper, we give a conversion that tightly converts a weakly secure public-key encryption scheme into an IND-CCA-secure KEM in the quantum random oracle model. More precisely, we define a new security notion for deterministic public key encryption (DPKE) called the disjoint simulatability, and we propose a way to convert a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme into an IND-CCA-secure key-encapsulation mechanism scheme without incurring a significant security degradation. In addition, we give DPKE schemes whose disjoint simulatability is tightly reduced to post-quantum assumptions. As a result, we obtain IND-CCA-secure KEMs tightly reduced to various post-quantum assumptions in the quantum random oracle model. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2018 | 10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_17 | ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY - EUROCRYPT 2018, PT III |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Tight security,Chosen-ciphertext security,Post-quantum cryptography,KEM | Conference | 10822 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0302-9743 | 5 | 0.40 |
References | Authors | |
29 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Tsunekazu Saito | 1 | 5 | 0.40 |
Keita Xagawa | 2 | 258 | 20.51 |
Takashi Yamakawa | 3 | 12 | 9.35 |