Paper Info
Title
Dividing the threshold: Multi-probe localized EM analysis on threshold implementations
Abstract
Cryptographic implementations typically need to be secured to retain their secrets in the presence of attacks. As a countermeasure to prevent side-channel attacks, threshold implementations are a commonly encountered concept. They resemble a multi-party computation, where the value is split in independent shares and processed separately. In this work, we challenge the underlying security assumption that observing these individually processed values is difficult. We observe leakage by spatially separating the shares on an FPGA using multiple electro-magnetic (EM) probes simultaneously for localized EM analysis. We experimentally verify that the security gain is 238 times less with this method when compared to the power side-channel. In total, we only need 4,300 traces to break a second-order secure implementation. Moreover, such a reduction in protection level is only possible when using multiple probes and applying our attack strategy which is based on state-of-the-art template attacks. This attack can easily be carried out by any attacker at the expense of buying more probes which emphasizes the danger of such attacks.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1109/HST.2018.8383888
2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
Keywords
Field
DocType
Side-Channel Analysis (SCA),Localized EM,Threshold Implementation,Combined Measurements
Countermeasure,Leakage (electronics),Division (mathematics),Computer science,Signal-to-noise ratio,Field-programmable gate array,Electronic engineering,Implementation,Side channel attack,Computer hardware,Computation
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
978-1-5386-4732-5
2
0.39
References 
Authors
14
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Specht, R.1102.22
Vincent Immler2224.27
Florian Unterstein382.18
Johann Heyszl414616.19
Georg Sigl544762.13