Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study multi-player turn-based games played on a directed graph, where the number of players and vertices can be infinite. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We focus on the recently introduced notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium weak SPE, a variant of the classical notion of SPE, where players who deviate can only use strategies deviating from their initial strategy in a finite number of histories. We give general conditions on the structure of the game graph and the preference relations of the players that guarantee the existence of a weak SPE, which moreover is finite-memory. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1007/978-3-662-54458-7_9 | FoSSaCS |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Conference | abs/1612.01402 | 0302-9743 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 9 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Véronique Bruyère | 1 | 429 | 43.59 |
| Stéphane Le Roux | 2 | 143 | 17.47 |
| Arno Pauly | 3 | 259 | 35.66 |
| Jean-François Raskin | 4 | 1735 | 100.15 |