Title
Congestion Games with Complementarities.
Abstract
We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study L-p norms and analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally, we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
ALGORITHMS AND COMPLEXITY (CIAC 2017)
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Congestion games,Aggregation,L-p norms,Complementarities,Existence of equilibria,Approximate pure Nash equilibria
Conference
10236
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Matthias Feldotto1145.50
Lennart Leder200.34
Alexander Skopalik324720.62