Title
Supply chain contract design of procurement and risk-sharing under random yield and asymmetric productivity information.
Abstract
•We consider contract design of procurement and risk-sharing under random yield.•The retailer cannot benefit from risk-sharing under symmetric information.•Both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit from risk-sharing under certain conditions.•Risk-sharing can weaken (enhance) the effect of asymmetric information on the retailer (manufacturer).•It is necessary to consider risk-sharing under random yield for the retailer.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1016/j.cie.2018.10.022
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Keywords
Field
DocType
Supply chain management,Asymmetric information,Random yield,risk-sharing,Contract design
Subsidy,Information asymmetry,Microeconomics,Best response,Supply chain,Risk sharing,Value of information,Engineering,Procurement,Operations management,Profit (economics)
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
126
0360-8352
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
18
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Caifeng Zhou100.68
Wansheng Tang255456.00
Yanfei Lan321815.92