Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this work, we present the first systematic study of data remanence effects on an intrinsic Static Random Access Memory Physical Unclonable Function (SRAM PUF) implemented on a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) device in the temperature range between –110 degrees Celsius and –40 degrees Celsius. Based on our experimental results, we propose a new type of attack against intrinsic SRAM PUFs, which takes advantage of data remanence effects exhibited due to low temperatures. We demonstrate that this attack is highly resistant to memory erasure techniques and can be used to manipulate the cryptographic keys produced by the SRAM PUF. Finally, we also discuss and assess potential countermeasures against the attack we propose. |
Year | Venue | DocType |
|---|---|---|
2018 | IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive | Conference |
Volume | Citations | PageRank |
2016 | 1 | 0.38 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 6 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nikolaos Anagnostopoulos | 1 | 22 | 9.61 |
| Stefan Katzenbeisser | 2 | 1844 | 143.68 |
| Markus Rosenstihl | 3 | 1 | 0.38 |
| André Schaller | 4 | 28 | 5.32 |
| Sebastian Gabmeyer | 5 | 47 | 6.74 |
| Tolga Arul | 6 | 22 | 9.60 |