Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Auction is an effective way to allocate goods or services to bidders who value them the most. The rapid growth of e-auctions facilitates online transactions but poses new and distinctive challenges. It is difficult to establish trust among sellers, buyers, and auctioneers without centralized auction websites or platforms (the auctioneer) which collect bids and derive the auction results. However, these third parties may be untrustworthy, and malicious sellers or buyers may refuse to deliver the goods or payment according to the protocol. Moreover, the open and anonymous online environment may stimulate auction participants to form collusion coalitions to rig the auction and reap unfair profit. Many auction designs have been proposed to address these concerns, but they fall short of simultaneously achieving decentralization (i.e., held without a trusted third utility), strong consensus (i.e., the establishment of trust), collusion resistance, and practical implementation. We present
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, the first decentralized collusion-resistant e-auction system that is implemented with smart contract on the blockchain. With the carefully designed smart auction contract, mutually distrustful and rational sellers and buyers are stimulated to operate properly, hence transact safely without trusted third parties. The auction mechanism in the smart contract can effectively prevent bidder collusion and realize economic robustness, i.e., truthfulness. We implement a fully functional
<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">CReam</italic>
on the Ethereum network. Extensive experimental results confirm that
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can greatly reduce the probability of collusion and achieve an approximate optimal revenue at a low cost of contract execution. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2883275 | IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Cryptography,Resistance,Internet,Economics | Revenue,Computer vision,Computer security,Cryptography,Computer science,Robustness (computer science),Auction theory,Artificial intelligence,Payment,The Internet,Collusion,Smart contract | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
14 | 7 | 1556-6013 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
5 | 0.43 | 0 |
Authors | ||
6 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shuangke Wu | 1 | 7 | 1.12 |
| Yanjiao Chen | 2 | 48 | 14.98 |
| Qian Wang | 3 | 3091 | 152.46 |
| Minghui Li | 4 | 18 | 4.67 |
| Cong Wang | 5 | 4463 | 204.50 |
| LUO Xiang-yang | 6 | 31 | 4.31 |