Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Through past decades, there has been extensive research on algorithmic game theory techniques for solving multicast routing problem in the networks: if one can incentivize a subset of edges to connect all base stations in the networks, where edges are owned by strategic agents, which subset should be selected so that the total cost of edges is minimized? To solve this problem, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism is applied, which pays a premium to incentivize the edges to reveal their cost truthfully. However, as discovered in this paper, VCG mechanism for network construction may suffer from a new cheating pattern, named false-name bidding, where bidder can gain profit by submitting bids under multiple fictitious name. Such cheating can undermine efficiency and increase the expenditure of the auctioneer. To overcome this hurdle, we propose the core-selecting multicast routing mechanism. The number of the core constraints are too large for computing and we reduce the number of core constraints through several ways to make the computation possible and apply Vickrey-nearest pricing rule for incentivizing the bidders. Experiments are conducted on real-life networks to show that the payment of our mechanism is lower than the payment of VCG mechanism. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1109/BDCloud.2018.00024 | 2018 IEEE Intl Conf on Parallel & Distributed Processing with Applications, Ubiquitous Computing & Communications, Big Data & Cloud Computing, Social Computing & Networking, Sustainable Computing & Communications (ISPA/IUCC/BDCloud/SocialCom/SustainCom) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Multicast Routing,False name proof Protocol | Computer science,Computer network,Algorithmic game theory,Common value auction,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Multicast,Cheating,Total cost,Multimedia,Payment,Bidding | Conference |
ISSN | ISBN | Citations |
2158-9178 | 978-1-7281-1141-4 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 6 |