Title
Leader Selection via Supermodular Game for Formation Control in Multiagent Systems.
Abstract
Multiagent systems (MASs) are usually applied with agents classified into leaders and followers, where selecting appropriate leaders is an important issue for formation control applications. In this paper, we investigate two leader selection problems in second-order MAS, namely, the problem of choosing up to a given number of leaders to minimize the formation error and the problem of choosing the minimum number of leaders to achieve a tolerated level of error. We propose a game theoretical method to address them. Specifically, we design a supermodular game for the leader selection problems and theoretically prove its supermodularity. In order to reach Nash equilibrium of the game, we propose strategies for the agents to learn to select leaders based on stochastic fictitious play. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that our method outperforms existing ones.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1109/TNNLS.2019.2900592
IEEE transactions on neural networks and learning systems
Keywords
Field
DocType
Games,Nash equilibrium,Nickel,Multi-agent systems,Control systems,Shape
Computer science,Multi-agent system,Artificial intelligence,Machine learning
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
30
12
2162-237X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
13
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Lei Xue110316.03
Xianghui Cao255543.42