Title
Evidence of Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs.
Abstract
Recent Medicare legislation seeks to improve patient care quality by financially penalizing providers for hospital-acquired infections (HAIs). However, Medicare cannot directly monitor HAI rates and instead relies on providers accurately self-reporting HAIs in claims to correctly assess penalties. Consequently, the incentives for providers to improve service quality may disappear if providers upcode, i.e., misreport HAIs (possibly unintentionally) in a manner that increases reimbursement or avoids financial penalties. Identifying upcoding in claims data is challenging because of unobservable confounders (e.g., patient risk). We leverage state-level variations in adverse event reporting regulations and instrumental variables to discover contradictions in HAI and present-on-admission (POA) infection reporting rates that are strongly suggestive of upcoding. We conservatively estimate that 10,000 out of 60,000 annual reimbursed claims for POA infections (18.5%) were upcoded HAIs, costing Medicare $200 million. Our findings suggest that self-reported quality metrics are unreliable and, thus, that recent legislation may result in unintended consequences.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1287/mnsc.2017.2996
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Medicare,pay-for-performance,upcoding,asymmetric information,quality control,detection
Journal
65
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
3
0025-1909
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
3
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hamsa Bastani100.34
Joel Goh21649.07
Mohsen Bayati367844.93