Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The use of untrusted design tools, components, and designers, coupled with untrusted device fabrication, introduces the possibility of malicious modifications being made to integrated circuits (ICs) during their design and fabrication. These modifications are known as hardware trojans. The widespread use of commercially purchased 3rd party intellectual property (3PIP) and commercial design tools extends even into trusted design flows. Unfortunately, due to the theoretical result that there is no program that can decide whether any other program will eventually halt, we know that the properties of a program, or circuit, cannot be known in advance of running it. While we can design a circuit to meet some functional specification and generate a simulation or test suite to obtain at least probabilistic confidence that the circuit implements the intended functionality, we cannot test a circuit for unintended functionality due to the combinatorially large state space. To address these concerns, we have developed a design-time method for automatically and systematically modifying portions of a design that exhibit characteristics of hardware trojans. After each modification, the functionality of the design is verified against a comprehensive simulation suite to ensure that the intended circuit functionality has not been changed. This approach can be applied to any digital circuit and does not rely on secret keys or obfuscation. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1007/s41635-018-0058-x | Journal of Hardware and Systems Security |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Hardware security, Trusted hardware, Hardware trojan detection, Hardware trojan prevention | Journal | 3 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 2509-3436 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jason R. Hamlet | 1 | 2 | 2.55 |
| Jackson Mayo | 2 | 43 | 7.97 |
| Vivian G. Kammler | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |