Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
The ongoing changes, updates, and upgrades of the Smart Grid infrastructure open up new cybersecurity challenges whose successful and satisfactory handling is a vital necessity for a viable future of these initiatives. The characteristic of the Smart Grid that leads to physical damage and cascading power failures amplifies the severity of security breaches. A set of recent successful Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on the Internet, facilitated by the proliferation of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) powered botnets, shows that the Smart Grid may become the target and likely victim of such an attack, potentially leaving catastrophic outage of power service to millions of people. In this paper, under a hierarchical data collection infrastructure we propose a general and scalable mitigation approach, called Minimally Invasive Attack Mitigation via Detection Isolation and Localization (MIAMI-DIL), based on an online and nonparametric anomaly detection algorithm which is scalable and capable of timely detection. We provide a proof-of-concept by means of simulations to show the efficacy and scalability of the proposed approach. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2021 | 10.1016/j.jfranklin.2019.02.011 | Journal of the Franklin Institute |
DocType | Volume | Issue |
Journal | 358 | 1 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0016-0032 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Yasin Yilmaz | 1 | 195 | 25.95 |
Suleyman Uludag | 2 | 302 | 17.13 |