Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
A Stackelberg security Markov game based on partial information for strategic decision making against unexpected attacks |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper considers an important class of Stackelberg security problems, which is characterized by the fact that defenders and attackers have incomplete information at each stage about the value of the current state. The inability to observe the exact state is motivated by the fact that it is impossible to measure exactly the state variables of the defenders and attackers. Most existing approaches for computing Stackelberg security games provide no guarantee if the estimated model is inaccurate. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1016/j.engappai.2019.03.010 | Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Security,Stackelberg games,Partially observable Markov models,Markov games | Convergence (routing),Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Random walk,Markov model,Markov chain,Nonlinear programming,Resource allocation,Stackelberg competition,Complete information | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
81 | 0952-1976 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.35 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Silvia E. Albarran | 1 | 2 | 0.70 |
| Silvia E. Albarran | 2 | 2 | 0.70 |
| Julio B. Clempner | 3 | 91 | 20.11 |