Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the problem is often tractable for so-called network centrality games and influence attribution games, as well as an example when optimal manipulation is intractable, even though computing power indices is feasible. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2019 | arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory | coalitional games,reliability extension,Shapley value,manipulation |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Budget constraint,Computer science,Shapley value,Centrality,Theoretical computer science,Attribution,Artificial intelligence,Machine learning | Journal | abs/1903.01165 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 32 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gabriel Istrate | 1 | 99 | 24.96 |
| Cosmin Bonchiş | 2 | 13 | 7.75 |
| Alin Brîndusescu | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |