Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Data-oriented attacks manipulate non-control data to alter a programu0027s benign behavior without violating its control-flow integrity. It has been shown that such attacks can cause significant damage even in the presence of control-flow defense mechanisms. However, these threats have not been adequately addressed. In this SoK paper, we first map data-oriented exploits, including Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) attacks, to their assumptions/requirements and attack capabilities. We also compare known defenses against these attacks, in terms of approach, detection capabilities, overhead, and compatibility. Then, we experimentally assess the feasibility of a detection approach that is based on the Intel Processor Trace (PT) technology. PT only traces control flows, thus, is generally believed to be not useful for data-oriented security. However, our work reveals that data-oriented attacks (in particular the recent DOP attacks) may generate side-effects on control-flow behavior in multiple dimensions, which manifest in PT traces. Based on this evaluation, we discuss challenges for building deployable data-oriented defenses and open research questions. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2019 | arXiv: Cryptography and Security | Open research,Computer security,Computer science,Exploit,Multiple time dimensions |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Journal | abs/1902.08359 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 7 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Long Cheng | 1 | 80 | 12.40 |
| Hans Liljestrand | 2 | 3 | 4.13 |
| Thomas Nyman | 3 | 77 | 7.98 |
| Yu Tsung Lee | 4 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Danfeng Yao | 5 | 965 | 74.85 |
| T Jaeger | 6 | 2635 | 255.67 |
| N. Asokan | 7 | 2889 | 211.44 |