Title
On the Computation of Strategically Equivalent Rank-0 Games.
Abstract
It has been well established that in a bimatrix game, the rank of the matrix formed by summing the payoff (or cost) matrices of the players has an impact on the runtime of the algorithms that converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game. In this paper, we devise a fast linear time algorithm that exploits strategic equivalence between bimatrix games to identify whether or not a given bimatrix game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, and if it is, then we present an algorithm that computes a strategically equivalent zero-sum game.
Year
Venue
DocType
2019
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory
Journal
Volume
Citations 
PageRank 
abs/1904.00450
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Joseph L. Heyman101.35
Abhishek Gupta21410.61