Abstract | ||
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Cryptographic anonymous credential schemes allow users to prove their personal attributes, such as age, nationality, or the validity of a ticket or a pre-paid pass, while preserving their privacy, as such proofs are unlinkable and attributes can be selectively disclosed. Recently, Chase et al. (CCS 2014) observe that in such systems, a typical setup is that the credential issuer also serves as the verifier. They introduce keyed-verification credentials that are tailored to this setting. In this paper, we present a novel keyed-verification credential system designed for lightweight devices (primarily smart cards). By using a novel algebraic MAC based on Boneh-Boyen signatures, we achieve the most efficient proving protocol compared to existing schemes. To demonstrate the practicality of our scheme in real applications, including large-scale services such as public transportation or e-government, we present an implementation on a standard, off-the-shelf, Multos smart card. While using significantly higher security parameters than most existing implementations, we achieve performance that is more than 44% better than the current state-of-the-art implementation. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2019 | 10.1007/978-3-030-22312-0_20 | ICT SYSTEMS SECURITY AND PRIVACY PROTECTION, SEC 2019 |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Privacy, Anonymous credentials, Authentication, Smart cards | Computer security,Computer science,Smart card | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
562 | 1868-4238 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Jan Camenisch | 1 | 6453 | 366.63 |
Manu Drijvers | 2 | 41 | 5.90 |
Petr Dzurenda | 3 | 12 | 8.99 |
Jan Hajny | 4 | 12 | 5.95 |