Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we first propose an adaptive strategy for double-spending attack on blockchains. The attacker in our strategy observes the length of the honest branch when a submitted transaction becomes available in the blockchain, and then updates the attack strategy accordingly. This provides a stronger strategy than conventional double-spending attack. We then derive closed-form expressions for the probability of a successful attack and the expected reward of attacker miners. Our analysis shows that the probability of a successful attack by convincing the network nodes to follow the counterfeit branch under the proposed attack strategy is 60% higher than what is expected from the conventional attack strategy when the attackers acquire 40% of the total network processing power. To counter this increase in the probability of attack, the network nodes are required to use a bigger number of confirmation blocks for validating any transaction in the blockchain. We computed the. expected reward of an attacker for mining a counterfeit branch on a blockchain and observed that the expected reward drops to zero after a few number of block confirmations. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1109/Cybermatics_2018.2018.00216 | 2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
blockchain,double-spending,security,attack | Expression (mathematics),Computer security,Computer science,Node (networking),Blockchain,Double spending,Network processing,Counterfeit,Database transaction | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
978-1-5386-7975-3 | 2 | 0.43 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gholamreza Ramezan | 1 | 11 | 1.64 |
| Cyril Leung | 2 | 899 | 62.23 |
| Z. Jane Wang | 3 | 30 | 3.98 |