Title
On the core, nucleolus and bargaining sets of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs
Abstract
Depended on the expected values of fuzzy numbers, a total order relation of fuzzy numbers is proposed. We show that three concepts of the indifference fuzzy core, nucleolus and bargaining sets of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs are well-defined following from this total order relation, whereas it is impossible to define by any partial order relation of fuzzy numbers for these concepts. Moreover, we raise a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the indifference fuzzy core. It is further shown that there is at least one fuzzy payoff vector in the indifference fuzzy nucleolus. For convex or superadditive cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs, the indifference fuzzy bargaining sets coincide with the indifference fuzzy core.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.3233/JIFS-181982
JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENT & FUZZY SYSTEMS
Keywords
Field
DocType
Cooperative games,fuzzy payoffs,core,nucleolus,bargaining sets
Mathematical economics,Fuzzy logic,Artificial intelligence,Mathematics,Machine learning,Nucleolus
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
36
6
1064-1246
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
xia zhang12710.42
Hao Sun23110.18
Genjiu Xu3307.31
Dongshuang Hou4116.27