Title
Generalized Matching Games for International Kidney Exchange
Abstract
We introduce generalized matching games defined on a graph G = (V, E) with an edge weighting w and a partition V = V-1 boolean OR .... boolean OR V-n of V. The player set is N = {1, ..., n}, and player p is an element of N owns the vertices in V-p. The value v(S) of coalition S subset of N is the maximum weight of a matching in the subgraph of G induced by the vertices owned by players in S. If vertical bar V-p vertical bar = 1 for every player p we obtain the classical matching game. We prove that checking core nonemptiness is polynomial-time solvable if vertical bar V-p vertical bar <= 2 for each p and co-NP-hard if vertical bar V-p vertical bar <= 3 for each p. We do so via pinpointing a relationship with b-matching games and also settle the complexity classification on testing core non-emptiness for b-matching games. We propose generalized matching games as a suitable model for international kidney exchange programs, where the vertices in V correspond to patient-donor pairs and each V-p represents one country. For this setting we prove a number of complexity results.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.5555/3306127.3331721
adaptive agents and multi-agents systems
Keywords
Field
DocType
kidney exchanges,matching game,core,computational complexity
Graph,Matching game,Combinatorics,Weighting,Vertex (geometry),Computer science,Artificial intelligence,Partition (number theory),Machine learning,Computational complexity theory
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Péter Biró141.09
Walter Kern216924.26
Dömötör Pálvölgyi320229.14
Daniël Paulusma471278.49