Title
Complete null agent for games with externalities
Abstract
•Multi-agent interactive situations can be modeled by means of partition function form games.•The contribution of a player is redefined taking into account the externalities that he creates on other sets of players.•A new concept of null player for games with externalities is defined.•A family of values is introduced and characterized.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1016/j.eswa.2019.05.056
Expert Systems with Applications
Keywords
Field
DocType
Game theory,Multi-agent systems,Externalities,Partition function,Marginal contribution
Mathematical economics,Equiprobability,Computer science,Axiom,Shapley value,Generalization,Expert system,Externality,Artificial intelligence,Game theory,Machine learning
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
135
0957-4174
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4