Paper Info
Title
Strategic Bidding Of Private Information For Principal-Agent Type Dynamic Lq Networks
Abstract
In this paper, focusing on agents' strategic behavior in their private information utilization, we formulate two types of strategic bidding problems for a simple dynamic principal-agent type linear quadratic (LQ) network where a principal integrates agents' individual controls into the socially optimal one based on information bid by the agents. One is the case that all the agents minimize their own cost, which is undesirable for the principal. The other is an equilibrium in the presence of the incentive design motivated by the standard contract theory to reduce the wasteful social cost. Then we analytically derive optimal designs of strategic bidding for each type and discuss their implications and implementations.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.23919/ECC.2019.8796002
2019 18TH EUROPEAN CONTROL CONFERENCE (ECC)
Field
DocType
Citations 
Social cost,Contract theory,Strategic behavior,Computer science,Operations research,Implementation,Strategic bidding,Optimal design,Principal–agent problem,Private information retrieval
Conference
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yasuaki Wasa101.69
Toshiyuki Murao200.34
Takashi Tanaka33412.22
Kenko Uchida46018.80