Title
Authentication Against a Myopic Adversary
Abstract
We consider keyless authentication for point-to-point communication in the presence of a myopic adversary. In particular, the adversary has access to a non-causal noisy version of the transmission and may use this knowledge to choose a channel state; the receiver is successful if it either decodes to the correct message or correctly detects adversarial interference. We show that, depending on the relationship between the channels to the legitimate receiver and the adversary, the authentication capacity is either zero or bounded above by the no-adversary capacity. To this end we introduce a novel channel property, termed U -overwritability, which allows the adversary to make its false message appear legitimate. We conjecture that if the capacity is nonzero, it is in fact equal to the no-adversary capacity, and show that this is true for a particular binary model.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1109/CNS.2019.8802705
2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)
Keywords
Field
DocType
myopic adversary,keyless authentication,point-to-point communication,noncausal noisy version,channel state,correct message,adversarial interference,legitimate receiver,authentication capacity,no-adversary capacity,channel property
Authentication,Computer security,Computer science,Bounded set,Communication channel,Computer network,Interference (wave propagation),Adversary,Binary Independence Model,Decodes,Adversarial system
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
978-1-5386-7118-4
0
0.34
References 
Authors
4
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Allison Beemer114.41
Oliver Kosut200.34
Jörg Kliewer342.10
Eric Graves400.68
Paul L. Yu511316.40