Abstract | ||
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Recent works on embedded system security, which is becoming increasingly important, claim that dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) supports a natural defense against power analysis attacks. In this paper, however, we design a new DVFS-aware attack that 1) identifies the voltage and frequency values used for DVFS and 2) performs power analysis to extract cryptographic keys. Further, we propose a simple yet effective defense against DVFS-aware power analysis attacks: we generate noise against power analysis attacks by running random cryptographic instructions in slack time (if any) generated when a real-time task (e.g., an engine control task) finishes earlier than its worst-case execution time. To analyze the effectiveness of the new proposed attack and defense technique, we undertake a simulation study using a cycle-accurate micro-architectural simulator and an advanced power model. In the simulation study, our DVFS-aware power analysis attack increases the accuracy of secret key extraction by 1-22% compared to most existing power analysis attacks unaware of DVFS. Moreover, our defense policy decreases the success rate of the DVFS-aware power analysis attack by 2-22% compared to state-of-the-art approaches that use DVFS as a countermeasure against power analysis attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2018 | 10.1109/UEMCON.2018.8796806 | 2018 9th IEEE Annual Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference (UEMCON) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Embedded Systems,Security,DVFS,Power Analysis Attack,Countermeasure | Countermeasure,Power analysis,Cryptography,Computer science,Voltage,Least slack time scheduling,Execution time,Frequency scaling,Key (cryptography),Embedded system | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
978-1-5386-7694-3 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
11 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
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Fangming Chai | 1 | 3 | 0.71 |
Kyoung-Don Kang | 2 | 563 | 37.51 |