Title
On Relevant Equilibria in Reachability Games.
Abstract
We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). But sometimes several equilibria may coexist such that in one equilibrium no player reaches his target set whereas in another one several players reach it. It is thus very natural to identify “relevant” equilibria. In this paper, we consider different notions of relevant equilibria including Pareto optimal equilibria and equilibria with high social welfare. We provide complexity results for various related decision problems.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1007/978-3-030-30806-3_5
RP
Field
DocType
Citations 
Decision problem,Mathematical economics,Computer science,Directed graph,Pareto optimal,Reachability,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Nash equilibrium
Conference
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Thomas Brihaye146035.91
Véronique Bruyère242943.59
Aline Goeminne302.03
Nathan Thomasset400.34