Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
Attestation protocols use digital signatures and other cryptographic values to convey evidence of hardware state, program code, and associated keys. They require hardware support such as Trusted Execution Environments. Conclusions about attestations thus depend jointly on protocols, hardware services, and program behavior. We present a mechanized approach to modeling these properties, combining protocol analysis with axioms, that formalize hardware and software properties. Here, we model aspects of Intel's SGX mechanism. Above the underlying manufacturer-provided protocols, we build a modular user-level that uses its attestations to make trust decisions. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1007/978-3-030-31511-5_6 | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Conference | 11738 | 0302-9743 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Joshua D. Guttman | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
John D. Ramsdell | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |