Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Verifiable electronic voting promises to ensure the correctness of elections even in the presence of a corrupt authority, while providing strong privacy guarantees. However, few practical systems with end-to-end verifiability are expected to offer long term privacy, let alone guarantee it. Since good guarantees of privacy are essential to the democratic process, good guarantees of everlasting privacy must be a major goal of secure online voting systems. Various currently proposed solutions rely on unusual constructions whose security has not been established. Further, the cost of verifying the zero knowledge proofs of other solutions has only been partially analysed. Our work builds upon Moran and Naor's solution-and its extensions, applications and generalisations-to present a scheme which is additively homomorphic, efficient to verify, and rests upon well studied assumptions. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1007/978-3-030-30625-0_8 | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Voting,Everlasting privacy,Zero Knowledge Proofs | Journal | 11759 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0302-9743 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thomas Haines | 1 | 5 | 10.26 |
| Clémentine Gritti | 2 | 1 | 1.75 |