Abstract | ||
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Analyzing the security of cryptosystems under attacks based on the malicious modification of memory registers is a research topic of high importance. This type of attack may affect the randomness of the secret parameters by forcing a limited number of bits to a certain value which can be unknown to the attacker. In this context, we revisit the attack on DSA presented by Faugere, Goyet and Renault during the conference SAC 2012: we modify their method and provide a probabilistic approach in opposition to the heuristic proposed therein to measure the limits of the attack. More precisely, the main problem is formulated as a closest vector problem in a lattice, then we study the distribution of vectors with bounded norm in the lattices involved and apply the result to predict the attack behavior. The benefits of this approach are several: The probability of success of this attack can be lower bounded under some conjecture, which is validated by computational experiments. Also, it finds applications to the FLUSH+RELOAD side-channel attack, studied by van de Pol et al. At the end of the article, there is a summary of findings. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2019 | 10.1007/s10623-019-00633-w | DESIGNS CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHY |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
DSA,Lattices,Closest vector problem,Exponential sums | Discrete mathematics,Heuristic,Lattice (order),Probabilistic analysis of algorithms,Cryptosystem,Probabilistic logic,Conjecture,Mathematics,Bounded function,Randomness | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
87.0 | 11 | 0925-1022 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Ana I. Gomez | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
Domingo Gomez-perez | 2 | 61 | 10.22 |
Guénaël Renault | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |