Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We are given a set A of buyers, a set B of houses, and for each buyer a preference list, i.e., an ordering of the houses. A house allocation is an injective mapping τ from A to B, and τ is strictly better than another house allocation τ′≠τ if for every buyer i, τ′(i) does not come before τ(i) in the preference list of i. A house allocation is Pareto optimal if there is no strictly better house allocation. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1016/j.disc.2020.111886 | Discrete Mathematics |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Pareto optimal matching,Set system,Disjointly representable,Set pairs | Journal | 343 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
7 | 0012-365X | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 7 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dániel Gerbner | 1 | 46 | 21.61 |
| Balázs Keszegh | 2 | 156 | 24.36 |
| Methuku Abhishek | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Nagy Dániel T. | 4 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Balázs Patkós | 5 | 85 | 21.60 |
| Tompkins Casey | 6 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Xiao Chuanqi | 7 | 0 | 0.34 |