Title
Feedback Equilibrium for Dynamic Competitive and Cooperative Advertising.
Abstract
This paper not only studies the competitive advertising between the manufacturer in direct channel and the upstream retailer which is in distribution channel, but also investigates the cooperative advertising between the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer in distribution channel in the case that the downstream retailer faces a competition from direct channel. Through the establishment of Nash game-theoretic model between the manufacturer in direct channel and the upstream retailer which is in distribution channel, the optimal advertising decisions of distribution channel and the downstream retailer are obtained. On the other hand, in order to obtain the optimal advertising strategies of members in distribution channel, Stackelberg game-theoretic models are established in this study. In this paper, we find that when there is a manufacturer in direct channel competing with distribution channel, the advertising participation rate from the upstream manufacturer to the downstream retailer is higher than that in no competitions. Under asymmetric and symmetric competition, the profit of the upstream retailer in distribution channel is always higher than that of the manufacturer in direct channel. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1016/j.procs.2019.09.356
Procedia Computer Science
Keywords
Field
DocType
Cooperative advertising,Dynamic competition,Distribution channel,Direct channel
Advertising,Computer science,Communication channel,Stackelberg competition,Comparative advertising
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
159
1877-0509
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Shigui Ma100.34
Yong He2386.53
Ran Gu300.34
Sijie Li400.34