Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
FPGA-SoCs are heterogeneous computing systems consisting of reconfigurable hardware and high performance processing units. This combination enables a flexible design methodology for embedded systems. However, the sharing of resources between these heterogeneous systems opens the door to attacks from one system on the other. This work considers Direct Memory Access attacks from a malicious hardware block inside the reconfigurable logic on the CPU. Previous works have shown similar attacks on FPGA-SoCs containing no memory isolation between the FPGA and the CPU. Our work studies the same idea on a system based on the Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ architecture. This platform contains memory isolation mechanisms such as a system memory management unit, memory protection units and supports ARM TrustZone technology. Despite the existence of these protection mechanisms, the two attacks presented in this work show that a malicious hardware block can still interfere with a security critical task executed on the CPU inside ARM TrustZone
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Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1145/3338508.3359568 | Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security Workshop |
Keywords | DocType | ISBN |
dma attack, fpga-socs, hardware trojan, memory isolation, trusted execution environment, trustzone | Conference | 978-1-4503-6839-1 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mathieu Gross | 1 | 3 | 1.78 |
| Nisha Jacob | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Andreas Zankl | 3 | 64 | 7.78 |
| Georg Sigl | 4 | 447 | 62.13 |