Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider the problem faced by a network administrator (defender) when deploying limited security resources to protect a network against a strategic attacker. To evaluate the effectiveness of a defense strategy, one must consider possible counterattacks that an attacker can choose. We use game theory to model the interaction between the defender and the attacker. Game theory provides relevant concepts and algorithms for computing optimal strategies in environments with multiple decision makers. To model the space of attacker’s possible actions, we use attack graphs, that compactly represent all known sequences of attacker’s action that may lead to successful attack for a given network. We demonstrate our approach on a specific type of defense actions, where the defender deploys deceptive hosts and services (honeypots) to detect and mitigate attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1016/j.cose.2019.101578 | Computers & Security |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Game theory,Network security,Honeypot,Network configuration management,Stackelberg equilibrium,Heuristic algorithms | Heuristic,Computer security,Computer science,Network security,Network topology,Network administrator,Heuristics,Game theory,Stackelberg competition,Scalability | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
87 | 0167-4048 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Karel Durkota | 1 | 40 | 4.85 |
| Viliam Lisý | 2 | 219 | 26.66 |
| Branislav Bosanský | 3 | 86 | 14.41 |
| Christopher Kiekintveld | 4 | 1179 | 94.94 |
| Michal Pěchouček | 5 | 1134 | 133.88 |