Title
Repeated Stackelberg Security Games: Learning with Incomplete State Information
Abstract
•Presents a solution for security games employing partially observable Markov chains.•Implements a reinforcement learning algorithm.•Suggests two adaptive rules one for the transition matrix and one for the estimated costs.•Employs a proximal/gradient algorithm to compute the equilibrium strategies of the game.•Formulates a new patrolling planner in terms of a random walk based on partial information.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1016/j.ress.2019.106695
Reliability Engineering & System Safety
Keywords
Field
DocType
Reinforcement learning,Incomplete information,Security games.
Convergence (routing),Rationality,Scheduling (computing),Behavioral modeling,Markov chain,Theoretical computer science,Engineering,Perfect information,Stackelberg competition,Reliability engineering,Reinforcement learning
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
195
0951-8320
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.35
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Guillermo Alcantara-Jiménez110.35
Julio B. Clempner29120.11