Paper Info
Title
A Bargaining Solution With Level Structure
Abstract
Presently, a conventional coalition structure can no more cover all the types of cooperative structures in practice, external cooperation between the coalitions also affects the payoff allocation between the participants. We propose a solution to solve the bargaining problem with level structure by defining for each coalition and each level. The solution concentrates on the bargaining of the coalitions with each other at each level. Furthermore, we discuss the applications of this solution to bankruptcy games with level structure. The proposed solution generalizes the bargaining solution with conventional coalition structure, which can be utilized in more cooperative types with level structures. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press SARL.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.2991/ijcis.d.191016.002
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Game theory, Level structure, Bargaining solution, Bankruptcy problem
Journal
12
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
2
1875-6891
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Xiao Yan1227.04
Deng-Feng Li296846.12