Paper Info
Title
Quantum prisoner's dilemma in a restricted one-parameter strategic space.
Abstract
Choosing a suitable restricted strategic space is crucial for the novel features of quantum games. Based on the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein quantization scheme, a quantum prisoner’s dilemma is introduced using a simple restricted one-parameter strategic space. Our scheme is found to preserve the quantum advantages of the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein scheme, and improve its Nash equilibrium characteristics. The simplicity of the calculations enables us to address some important aspects of quantum games which can be applied to many real systems. The robustness of Nash equilibria to corruption in the initial state is studied, and a measure of robustness is defined. The robustness of Nash equilibria is found to scale inversely with the entanglement. Our scheme is applied to various prisoner’s dilemma games having different dilemma strength. Also, Some variant forms of restricted one-parameter strategic space are studied.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1016/j.amc.2019.124927
Applied Mathematics and Computation
Keywords
Field
DocType
Prisoner’s dilemma,Nash equilibrium,Pareto optimality,Mixed-strategy,Quantum games,One-parameter strategic space,Entanglement,Noise,Corruption,Robustness of nash equilibria,Dilemma strength,Scaling parameters
Quantum,Mathematical optimization,Quantum entanglement,Prisoner's dilemma,Robustness (computer science),Dilemma,Quantization (signal processing),Nash equilibrium,Real systems,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
370
0096-3003
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ahmed S. Elgazzar100.34