Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (J Econ Theory 100:295–328, 2001) show that there is no rule satisfying stochastic dominance efficiency,equal treatment of equals and stochastic dominance strategy-proofness for a probabilistic assignment problem of indivisible objects. Recently, Mennle and Seuken (Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategy-proofness for the random assignment problem. Mimeo, 2017) show that stochastic dominance strategy-proofness is equivalent to the combination of three axioms, swap monotonicity,upper invariance, and lower invariance. In this paper, we introduce a weakening of stochastic dominance strategy-proofness, called upper-contour strategy-proofness, which requires that if the upper-contour sets of some objects are the same in two preference relations, then the sum of probabilities assigned to the objects in the two upper-contour sets should be the same. First, we show that upper-contour strategy-proofness is equivalent to the combination of two axioms, upper invariance and lower invariance. Next, we show that the impossibility result still holds even though stochastic dominance strategy-proofness is weakened to upper-contour strategy-proofness. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1007/s00355-019-01226-1 | Social Choice and Welfare |
DocType | Volume | Issue |
Journal | 54 | 4 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0176-1714 | 1 | 0.35 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Youngsub Chun | 1 | 94 | 20.80 |
| Kiyong Yun | 2 | 1 | 0.35 |