Paper Info
Title
Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?
Abstract
We consider a setting in which bidders participate in multiple auctions run by different sellers, and optimize their bids for the aggregate auction. We analyze this setting by formulating a game between sellers, where a seller’s strategy is to pick an auction to run. Our analysis aims to shed light on the recent change in the Display Ads market landscape: here, ad exchanges (sellers) were mostly running second-price auctions earlier and over time they switched to variants of the first-price auction, culminating in Google’s Ad Exchange moving to a first-price auction in 2019. Our model and results offer an explanation for why the first-price auction occurs as a natural equilibrium in such competitive markets.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1145/3366423.3380142
WWW '20: The Web Conference 2020 Taipei Taiwan April, 2020
Keywords
DocType
ISBN
First-price auction, competitive market, Nash equilibrium
Conference
978-1-4503-7023-3
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
renato paes133136.45
Balasubramanian Sivan244.52
yifeng teng384.04