Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider a setting in which a rail infrastructure provider divides the track costs proportionally between the above-rail operators based on their usage. We study a proposed access charge regime aimed at incentivizing the operators to use longer train configurations. The regime sets a target length and gives a discount on an operator's charge if it deploys a configuration of at least the target. That is, the operators may be able to reduce their access charges by deploying a longer train configuration. We analyze the policy, and conditions under which both operators have an incentive to deploy long train configurations. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1007/s13676-018-0133-z | EURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Non-cooperative game theory,Freight transport,Infrastructure pricing,Train path,Transport policy | Journal | 8 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
5 | 2192-4376 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 1 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Martin Savelsbergh | 1 | 2624 | 190.83 |
| Masoud Talebian | 2 | 8 | 1.81 |