Paper Info
Title
Low-Noise Llc Side-Channel Attack With Perf
Abstract
Many cache side-channel attacks have been proposed, and they threaten sensitive programs in real-world. The success of the attacks depends on how accurately to decide whether a set of cache lines are in cache or not. However, external factors insert noise into cache attacks, and the noise disturbs the attacks' decision process. Attacks in last-level cache (LLC) have more noise compared with core-dedicated caches.In this paper, we propose an attack method using Perf-a performance analyzing tool in Linux, attack(Perf), to achieve low-noise in cache side-channel attacks to LLC. The proposed method utilizes Perf to decide cache hits/misses when accessing memory. Since Perf gets the number of cache hits and misses from hardware performance counters, it can identify the cache hits/misses of memory accesses with the less noise. For evaluation, we compare the performance of attack(stimer) (existing attack method) and attacks(Perf) by implementing Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe. For the accuracy of Perf, we compare the clock cycles of the timer and the counts of Perf according to the victim's access.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1007/978-3-030-39303-8_25
INFORMATION SECURITY APPLICATIONS, WISA 2019
Keywords
Field
DocType
Side-channel, Cache attack, Perf, Hardware performance counter, Multi-core attack
Computer security,Computer science,Low noise,Side channel attack,Electrical engineering
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
11897
0302-9743
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Youngjoo Ko100.34
Sangwoo Ji201.35
Jong Uk Kim3595.56