Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Dynamic and partial reconfiguration together with hardware parallelism make FPGAs attractive as virtualized accelerators. However, recently it has been shown that multi-tenant FPGAs are vulnerable to remote side-channel attacks (SCA) from malicious users, allowing them to extract secret keys without a logical connection to the victim core. Typical mitigations against such attacks are hiding and masking schemes, to increase attackers' efforts in terms of side-channel measurements. However, they require significant efforts and tailoring for a specific algorithm, hardware implementation and mapping. In this paper, we show a hiding countermeasure against voltage-based SCA that can be integrated into any implementation, without requiring modifications or tailoring to the protected module. We place a properly mapped Active Fence of ring oscillators between victim and attacker circuit, enabled as a feedback of an FPGA-based sensor, leading to reduced side-channel leakage. Our experimental results based on a Lattice ECP5 FPGA and an AES-128 module show that two orders of magnitude more traces are needed for a successful key recovery, while no modifications to the underlying cryptographic module are necessary. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1109/ICCAD45719.2019.8942094 | ICCAD-IEEE ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Leakage (electronics),Masking (art),Cryptography,Computer science,Voltage,Field-programmable gate array,Communication channel,Real-time computing,Control reconfiguration,Embedded system,Key recovery | Conference | 2019 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
1933-7760 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 5 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jonas Krautter | 1 | 6 | 2.23 |
| Dennis Gnad | 2 | 56 | 6.73 |
| Falk Schellenberg | 3 | 27 | 6.05 |
| Amir Moradi | 4 | 960 | 80.66 |
| Mehdi B. Tahoori | 5 | 1537 | 163.44 |