Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Vehicular network is the enabler of various services for transportation means including safety and infotainment applications. It can better deal with the highly dynamic nature of roads and highways. Meanwhile, the existing infrastructure of the cellular networks is unable to cope with the heavy traffic imposed mainly by videos. Thus, the cellular operators may leverage Roadside Untis (RSU) to offload video traffic and provide better quality of experience for vehicle customers. In this paper, we propose a pricing model that motivates RSU owners to cooperate with the cellular operators in order to offer better quality of experience (QoE) and offload substantial part of videos traffic from the cellular networks. The pricing model also motivates the vehicle owners to cooperate with the RSU to deliver contents to each other and aims to maximize RSU revenue and provide a wide range of QoS levels to the content providers in order to give them a degree of freedom to choose the suitable level of quality for their customers and based on their allocated budgets. We prove this problem is hard to solve, then we propose a lightweight greedy methods as alternative solutions. The conducted results show the efficiency of the proposed solutions and their ability to obtain results similar or so close to the optimal solutions. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100215 | Vehicular Communications |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
RSU revenue,Resource allocation,Video on demand,VANETs | Journal | 23 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
2214-2096 | 3 | 0.38 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 4 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ahmed Al-Hilo | 1 | 7 | 1.43 |
| Dariush Ebrahimi | 2 | 3 | 0.38 |
| sanaa sharafeddine | 3 | 145 | 23.26 |
| Chadi Assi | 4 | 1357 | 137.73 |