Paper Info
Title
An Evolutionary Game For Analyzing Switching Behavior Of Consumers In Electricity Retail Markets
Abstract
Many countries have deregulated their electricity retail markets to offer lower electricity charges to consumers. However, many consumers have not switched their suppliers after the deregulation, and electricity suppliers do not tend to reduce their charges intensely. This paper proposes an electricity market model and evolutionary game to analyze the behavior of consumers in electricity retail markets. Our model focuses on switching costs such as an effort at switching, costs in searching for other alternatives, and so on. The evolutionary game examines whether consumers choose a strategy involving exploration of new alternatives with the searching costs as "cooperators" or not. Simulation results demonstrate that the share of cooperators was not improved by simply giving rewards for cooperators as compensation for searching costs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the degree of cooperators in a network among consumers has a vital role in increasing the share of cooperators and switching rate.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1587/transfun.2019MAP0003
IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES
Keywords
Field
DocType
graph theory, evolutionary game theory, utility maximization, bounded rationality, switching costs
Electricity,Microeconomics,Theoretical computer science,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
E103A
2
0916-8508
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.48
0
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ryo Hase110.82
Norihiko Shinomiya25019.15